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Juris-fiction:  
Literature and the Law of the Law 
 
The poem is the cry of its occasion, 
Part of the res itself and not about it. 
WALLACE STEVENS 
“An Ordinary Evening in New Haven” 
 
Lauding editors on these occasions is rightly suspect, but here it is simply 
unavoidable. Gary Boire’s pathbreaking, of course, conspectus and analysis of 
colonial law and postcolonial literature provides not only a point of departure for my 
paper but also its generative orientation – a continuing on the path broken. 
Briefly, for now, Boire draws on representations of law in postcolonial literatures 
to reveal a disruptive ambivalence in colonial law. Bluntly, for now, I will try to show 
how that ambivalence also constitutes law, and not just colonial law, and try to show 
how this constitution of law can be derived from a quality of literature, and not just 
postcolonial literatures. All of which will not involve minimizing or marginalizing the 
postcolonial in its relation to law or to literature. On the contrary, the postcolonial will 
provide the focal opening to these perceptions of law and of literature more generally 
conceived. And, it will transpire, the postcolonial does this with an apt irony, an irony 
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that can be summarily derived from Hardt and Negri’s criticism of postcolonial 
positions. They perceive, with some accuracy, that the postcolonial is derived from 
colonialism. For them that derivation containedly limits the utility of the postcolonial 
to “rereading history” (146). Not for the first time, Hardt and Negri fail to see the 
point of what they are criticising. The very force of the postcolonial comes from its 
integral yet resistant relation to the colonial, and from its thence revealing what is 
constituently of, and yet denied by, that selfsame colonial condition. This is not the 
revelation of some marginal matter but, rather, the disclosure of the very structuring 
(if the word may still be allowed) of the colonial. It is this efficacy of the resistant 
within imported by the postcolonial that is brought to bear now on the constitution of 
law generically. 
 
I. On the Immodesty of the Supplement. 
In a way that captures its pretensions, Boire sees colonial law as the dominating figure 
of colonial settlement and authority, as a hierarchized and monadic ordering that 
would encompass indigenous reality (e.g. 203, 209, 212). More pointedly, law enacts 
an interpretation of the social that “continues monologically throughout the entire 
social order by hegemonically drawing other areas of production into the perimeters 
of its own field” (203-04). This acquisitive movement of law is bolstered in its claim 
to neutrality and generality, even to universality (204, 209-10). Inevitably, there 
results an “implosive ambivalence” in law, and this entails a “repression” of what 
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insistently remains counter to law, of what transgressively opposes yet constitutes it 
(202, 204, 207, 211). 
Obviously we must return to these rich insights, but continuing in a synoptic vein, 
Boire finds in postcolonial literatures a tangible reflection of this ambivalence, and 
that reflection is the colonized subject who “is both the site of imperial legal 
inscription and that which threatens this very inscription” (204). The threat has 
something of a patinated quality, however. It is manifested as irony, mimicry, as a 
resistance dependent on “its own oppression” (212). Rather more exuberantly, that 
situated threat evokes the carnivalesque and the Saturnalia. Yet the Saturnalia must 
end, the carnival is over for another year. There seems, in all, to be some primal 
efficacy given to the colonial and to a colonial law whose “heterodoxic potential…is 
always subject to the exercise of hierarchical orthodoxy” (204). That this accurately 
depicts an impelling element of colonial law, even of law more widely understood, 
can hardly be denied. But what I want to begin putting in place now is something of a 
reversal of emphasis, a putting of “heterodoxical potential” before “hierarchical 
orthodoxy,” and to do this in the spirit of Tuitt’s brilliant depiction of the ability of the 
postcolonial text, literary or legal, to surpass the containment of the colonial, “to go 
outside the source that is presupposed by its very existence” (76). And a beginning 
can be derived from the extension of carnival in a way that Boire would want, in the 
company of Bakhtin, so as to celebrate, as carnival would, the “liberation from the 
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prevailing truth and from the established order,” and so as to elevate what always 
opposes the “immortalized and completed” (see 206).  
The claim to completeness – to an achieved, universalized truth – is aptly 
attributed by Boire to the type of imperialism his postcolonial literary representatives 
inhabit, to the nationalist imperialism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This 
nationalist imperialism laid claim to the universal, even though it was the product of 
particular nations. An inexorable logic ensued. The claim was an assertion of an 
absolute truth, a truth exemplified in the particular imperial nation. And this 
exemplarity could not be an identity positively conceived, a positive realization of the 
universal in the particular. This impossibility had two monumental, and contradictory, 
correlates. For one, the identity came to be formed negatively by constituting, for 
example, the savages as its antithesis. So much is commonplace. But analysis has to 
go further if this negative attribution of identity is not simply to reinforce the original 
arrogation of completeness, as happens in such as Said’s circular seeing of the West 
constructing itself in an oppositional reference to an Orient also constructed by it 
(Orientialism). So, to continue, the antithesis of the absolute or the universal can only 
be utterly antithetical. It has to be of a totally different kind of existence. Yet, and this 
is the further correlate and where the contradiction comes in, the universal has to be 
all-inclusive. The universalized existence exemplified by the imperial nations was one 
that all peoples would come to, including the colonized, even if that would take a 
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conveniently long time. Hence, social evolution. Yet the claim to the universal, to the 
absolute, has to remain relentless in its exclusion. Since the claim depends upon (for 
example) a savage condition apart, for the claim to stay in existence, the condition 
must stay always apart. It has to remain, in an ultimate way, quite unredeemable. Put 
another way, the claim to the universal can never be achieved in its own terms. It can 
never be ‘truly’ universal and thence all-inclusive because of its dependence on what 
must remain ever beyond it. That which is ever beyond, this intrinsic unsurpassability, 
marks the place of the postcolonial and institutes its “ambivalence.” 
To equate this quality of the postcolonial with law may at first seem extravagant. 
After all, law was at the forefront of the civilizing mission, not just a prime carrier but 
a valiant enforcer of colonial truth. And, as it came to pass, a blinkered colonial law 
proved incapable of existing beyond this attributed content. We may, for example, 
feel some faint sympathy for a colonial governor of Bombay when he remarked on 
“the perilous experiment of continuing to legislate for millions of people, with few 
means of knowing, except by a rebellion, whether the laws suited them or not” (see 
Thornton 181). Yet there are instances, now inadequately memorialized, where 
colonized people seized a colonial law and shaped it to their purposes in effecting 
liberatory transformations.1 Let me now take a more prominent illustration of the 
contrast between law as liberatory and law as arrogated truth, an illustration that can 
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carry the remainder of my analysis including a “literary supplement” which is rather 
less “modest” than the part Boire would allow such supplementing (213). 
 
II. Mandela 
The illustration is derived, with Derrida’s considerable help, from the thought of 
Mandela. The genres involved, autobiography and the speech from the dock, are at 
least unusual in engagements with postcolonial literatures, but they do have a quiddity 
which is important for my argument and, in any case, their depictions of law will be 
connected to more ‘fictional’ genres shortly.  
The momentous puzzle which Mandela presents us, and makes present, begins 
with Mandela as a critic of the laws, a legal realist, in describing his disenchantment 
with the rule of law and with the notion of equality before the law:  
 
…[M]y career as a lawyer and activist removed the scales from my eyes. I saw that there 
was a wide difference between what I had been taught in the lecture room and what I 
learned in the courtroom. I went from having an idealistic view of the law as a sort of 
justice to a perception of the law as a tool used by the ruling class to shape society in a 
way favourable to itself. (Long Walk 309) 
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And indeed, with the struggle against apartheid, it would be difficult to conceive of a 
situation where there was less cause for commitment to the laws, or to conceive of a 
person more intimately justified in refusing such commitment. And Mandela was 
certainly perspicacious and forthright on the matter of law’s pointed oppressions and 
failings, and not only in its constraining and incipiently deadly effect on him but also, 
and primarily, in law’s tentactular and pervasive subordination of his “people.” 
All of which could be sharply set against another Mandela, a Mandela existentially 
identified with the law, a Mandela who in the very midst of a realist critique lauds the 
court system as “perhaps the only place in South Africa where an African could 
possibly receive a fair hearing and where the rule of law might still apply” (Long 
Walk 308); a Mandela who presents himself before the very law he rejects, “rejects in 
the name of a superior law, the very one he declares to admire and before which he 
agrees to appear” (Derrida, “Reflection” 27); a Mandela who “regarded it as a duty 
which I owed, not just to my people, but also to my profession, to the practice of law, 
and to justice for all mankind, to cry out against this discrimination which is 
essentially unjust” (see Derrida, “Reflection” 35). Mandela, it would seem is now of 
“an idealistic view” and clean contrary to Mandela the realist, but not so. 
The “superior law” which Mandela affirms is not something set apart from or 
something about the existent law. Rather, it is integral to law as it is. Mandela 
advances a conception of “professional duty” which operatively respects and admires 
both the law and its judicial institution, even as the pervasive legal oppressions of 
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apartheid are being brought to bear on him (Derrida, “Reflection” 15-16, 33-37). The 
law which calls forth this magnanimous regard is the law that incipiently extends 
beyond its determinate existence through certain enabling qualities which “tend 
toward universality,” such qualities as the generality of the law, equality before the 
law, and “the independence and impartiality of …[the] judiciary” (Derrida, 
“Reflection” 17, 20-22; Mandela, “Prepared to Die” 9). These qualities are not ideals 
detached from a contrary legal reality, a reality of which Mandela was only too 
intimately aware (Long Walk 261, 309-10). They are qualities intrinsic to the being of 
law, to its integral extensiveness. 
The dimension of law sustaining these qualities of generality, impartiality and such 
(and they will be returned to later) could be extracted from the generality of law by 
way of Derrida’s “Force of Law.” There Derrida would want to “make explicit or 
perhaps produce a difficult and unstable distinction between justice and law, between 
justice (infinite, incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry …) and the 
exercise of justice as law, legitimacy or legality, a … calculable apparatus [dispositif], 
a system of regulated and coded prescriptions” (250). “Force of Law” was prefigured 
in Derrida’s “The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration” where the 
“superior law” (27) which Mandela embraces can be retrospectively equated with this 
“exercise of justice as law” in “Force”, with justice as it is realized by law, and as it 
thence and integrally subsists in law. This is a making experiential of a justice which 
it is impossible to experience in itself, even as that denies justice in its plenitude. For 
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law to be in such a relation to justice it must be utterly responsive, ‘without history, 
genesis, or any possible derivation. That would be the law of the law’ (“Before the 
Law” 19—his emphasis, but conveniently for me). It is in the operative combining of 
the law in its determinate dimension with this law of the law importing law’s vacuity, 
and hence law’s incipient possibility, that Mandela is in Derrida’s estimation “a man 
of the law by vocation” (“Reflection” 35). Mandela is then not an idealist. He is a 
realist but one who sees more in the real, and in the realizable, more than others see. 
 
III. Law like Literature 
 
The affinity between law and literature can illumine this dimension of law, the 
dimension enabling law to bring possibility into normatively determinate existence. 
The affine can be a troublesome category, however, and it has proved to be so here. 
“Law and literature” has become a settled enough field when it entails exploring 
literary depictions of the juridical, or when it comes to extracting literary qualities 
from an at times reluctant law (Aristodemou 8, 22). What remains challenging is the 
identification of law with literature (Tuitt 78). This would seem to go against law’s 
being tied to ‘reality,’ a constraint which would contrast law to literature, a constraint 
from which literature could liberate law, perhaps (Aristodemou 262-63; Goodrich). In 
the alternative, as it were, the contrast between law and literature corresponds to a 
necessary separation. Most notably, of course, there is Plato with his supposed 
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hostility to the poet – the poet who confounds the laws by calling everything into 
question by making “the words of poetry similar to whatever he [the poet] happens to 
be or regards virtue or wickedness” (Plato, para. 656c). Poetry opposes law as 
imagined worlds oppose what is ‘real,’ as the possible opposes the actual and the 
established (cf. Aristodemou 18-19, 180). Yet literature itself is often seen as the slave 
of the determinate, as ultimately serving certain specific and usually oppressive 
interests (Aristodemou 5-6), and this not just as a matter of its variable contents but in 
its very genres – a location that has proved troubling on this score to postcolonial 
writers (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 181-87). Can the novel, for example, surpass 
the bourgeois origins with which Said would saddle it (Culture and Imperialism 84, 
92-93)? 
If this suggests some similarity with law’s determinate dimension (a similarity 
taken up later), a reversal of the comparison suggests another. Returning to “Force of 
Law,” Derrida’s initiating engagement with Montaigne would equate “historical or 
positive” law with what is “fictional,” with what is “artifice” (240). Likewise, it 
would seem, with Nancy’s “juris-fiction” the law is that which is “modeled or 
sculpted (fictum) in terms of right:” “Since the case is not only unforeseen but has to 
be so, and since right is given as the case of its own utterance, so judicial discourse 
shows itself to be the true discourse of fiction” (Finite Thinking 156-57). Put in 
another perspective, if the situation of the case were entirely foreseeable or stilled, it 
would be given ‘fact’ and there would be no call for decision, for determination, for 
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law. There would be no fictive making the case speak. What is always involved with 
law, then, is the creative reaching out to a possibility beyond its determinate 
existence, a beyond where law ‘finds itself’ in being integrally tied to, and incipiently 
encompassing of, its exteriority. For Nancy, again, this would be the “law of the law 
itself [which] is always without law. The law overhangs all cases, but is itself the case 
of its institution;” hence “the law is able to be here, there, now, in this case, in this 
place…” (Corpus 48).2  
Taking now a condign account of “literature” from the many that Blanchot would 
offer, this one being apt because it is a prelude to his conception of right, we find that 
literature is an “opening” to what is beyond, to alterity and possibility, to “what is 
when there is no more world,” or “to what would be if there were no world,” to “the 
void” (“Literature” 388).3 But this void is of the kind encountered by Blanchot’s 
protagonist in The Madness of the Day for whom it was disappointing, a void which 
inexorably becomes “a presence” and protean: “one realizes the void, one creates a 
work” (Madness 8; “Literature” 395). Between the realized and the unrealizable, 
between the appropriated and that which is still “ours for being nobody’s,” there is a 
“shifting,” a “passing,” a “movement” impelled by “a marvelous force” which is the 
impossibility of the movement being otherwise. This is an activity always situated, an 
emplaced “affirmation,” “an operation” which cannot be separated “from its results” 
(Unavowable 29; “Literature” 363, 365, 369, 387, 389).  
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Literature for Blanchot, then, is a work like any other – he instances building a 
stove – even if it is such “to an outstanding degree” (“Literature” 371). Law and 
literature, it could now be said, share the same ambivalence between existent 
instantiation and what is ever beyond yet incipient in it.3 The comparison between law 
and literature more usually points to their opposition of course. Literature’s realms of 
the imagined and the possible oppose the all-too-solid certainty of law – that law-
confounding power of Plato’s poets for example. Yet it is exactly the aspect of 
literature to which Plato would putatively object, to its illimitable inventiveness and 
its quality of fiction, which impels law’s making.  And despite the incessant 
jurisprudential efforts to render law as ‘positive’, as posited, or as fact, society, 
economy, and so on, it refuses being in “a world sapped by crude existence” 
(“Literature” 395, for the phrase). Peremptorily,  the legal fiction can illustrate the 
formative location of law beyond existence, for with the fiction the enounced content 
of the particular law remains the same whereas operatively, and by way of the fiction, 
that content has changed to its opposite. So, and for example, in Roman law certain 
litigation could only be initiated by a Roman citizen but foreign litigants were able to 
do the same because of a fiction deeming them to be citizens for the purpose (Maine 
21). Thus, in Blanchot’s terms, a fiction is “truth and also indifference to truth” 
(“Literature” 396-97). 
 
IV The Law of the Law 
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Paralleling, and the culmination of, this engagement with “literature,” we find that for 
Blanchot the law of the law is inseparable from law and right (“Literature” 375-78).  
Law ‘in’ and of itself is quite uncontained and unsubordinated, a self-affirmation 
made “without reference to anything higher: to it alone, pure transcendence” (The 
Step 25).4 This law takes its instituted existence from its being beyond. “Let us grant,” 
says Blanchot, “that the law is obsessed with exteriority, by that which beleaguers it 
and from which it separates via the very separation that institutes it as form, in the 
very movement by which it formulates this exteriority as law” (Infinite Conversation 
434). This exteriority which is yet of the law, this law of the law, entails for Blanchot 
“a responsibility…towards the Other” that is “irreducible to all forms of legality 
through which one necessarily tries to regulate it,” but which ultimately “cannot be 
enounced in any already formulated language” (Unavowable Community 43). 
Matching this law of the law now with the dimensions derived from law earlier, it 
could be said that law ‘is’ the settlement in terms of a normative continuity of the 
existential divide between a determinate positioning and a responding to what is 
beyond position, and it is in the necessity yet impossibility of such settlement that law 
is iteratively impelled into existence. In their separation yet inexorable combining, 
these two dimensions form the horizon of law, a moving horizon – the horizon both as 
a condition and quality of law’s contained existence, and the horizon as opening onto 
all that lies beyond this existence. Law’s position within that horizon cannot be at all 
irenically set.  
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To give emphasis to this responsive dimension of law is to go against the epochal 
elevation of occidental law’s determinate dimension over the responsive. Yet this 
emphasis is hardly to deny that, if law continually becomes itself and is sustained in 
its responsiveness to exteriority, there must nonetheless be a positioned place where 
this responsiveness can be made determinate. That which is purely beyond is merely 
inaccessible, and out of responsive range. Law always returns to determinate position, 
and to sustain position there must be some shielding from an importunate 
responsiveness. There has, with any law, to be a constant, reductive effort to ensure 
that “the aleatory margin…remains homogeneous with calculation, within the order of 
the calculable” (Derrida, “Psyche” 55). So, even though law has to exceed all fixity of 
determination, has to to remain pervaded by the relation to what is beyond, labile and 
protean to an illimitable extent, there has also to be an accessible ordinariness to law’s 
extraordinary responsiveness. This responsiveness is something commonplace in 
processes of legal decision-making and in the quotidian claims which law’s adherents 
make on one another. The sense of originating, “the sense/ Of cold and earliness is a 
daily sense” (Stevens 123).  
 
V Consequences 
 
The affinity I have tried to sketch between law and the postcolonial, by way of the 
idea of literature, has been in terms of a mutually supportive similarity between them. 
 16
That endeavor took its initiating impetus from Boire’s configuring of law and 
postcolonial literatures. Whilst there was agreement that in the colonial situation law 
embedded the interest of the colonist in a “hierarchical orthodoxy” (202, 204), I 
sought to amplify Boire’s intimations that law, like the postcolonial, surpassed and 
disrupted such containment. Now, in something of a counter-corrective, I will 
conclude by implicating law’s surpassing as itself a cause of the containment, only 
then to indicate and illustrate how law’s surpassing ultimately does surpass. 
To set this closing enquiry, we could return to the disturbing point about literary 
genres, to their constituent implication with the specific histories and powers that 
generated them. In an immediate way, that would seem to be at odds with the 
illimitable openness of Blanchot’s “literature” until we remember that literature, like 
law, is for Blanchot (also) an existent “work” in the world (“Literature” 371), that it is 
some realization of an unrealizable which is inexorably compromised in the process. 
With law, the situation is even more stark for, canonical fiats aside, law is unlike 
literature in its intrinsically requiring an authoritative realization ‘for the time being,’ 
a determinative bringing of what is beyond into the normatively determinate. If law is 
to be able to do this, as we saw, it must be quite unrestrained. It cannot be attached to 
a past, even its own past, or to anything else (Derrida, “Before the Law” 190). Yet, 
and here is where the counter-corrective comes in, law’s unrestrained responsiveness, 
its lack of any confining ties, results in its not having any enduring content of its own. 
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It always depends for its very content and for much of its force on some power apart 
from itself. 
However, what also must follow from law’s refusal of any primal attachment is that 
its taking on of content is always to be mediated through law itself. No matter how 
seemingly abject law’s dependence in this, law will itself endow its borrowed 
contents with its own force and meanings, meanings which will often differ markedly 
from their source apart from law.5 Also, law will not simply absorb and recreate some 
singular source but will draw on many such, and even where law determinately 
elevates one source over another, this is not to exclude the other finally, much less to 
elevate the included pervasively. 
A final consequence, now, of the vacuity that comes from law’s intrinsically 
incorporative regard for what is ever beyond: this regard does not, or does not just, 
involve a denial of determinate content but involves, rather, the responsive opening of 
that content to the possibility of being otherwise, to becoming an effect of this 
possibility. This reflects, in a different light, Boire’s telling depiction of how law’s 
“universalizing and neutralizing rhetoric,” law’s “generality,” serves particular 
imperial interests by elevating them to some absolute condition. Whilst monotonously 
agreeing with that assessment also, let me extend law’s self-subversion to this scene 
as well. That will involve a quality found in any generative legal concept, but only 
two will be selected here, those singled out by Boire and, as we saw, exalted by 
Mandela: the neutrality and the generality of law. As for neutrality, or impartiality as 
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it is usually put, its legal force could be conveyed, at least obliquely, by looking at an 
example of its opposite, the political trial. Such a trial is not considered to be legal 
because some power apart from law determines the outcome. We tend to see this as a 
subterfuge, as something being presented as law that is not law. But what is it about 
law that this offends? After all law’s dependence on power apart from it has just been 
emphasized. Yet, as we also saw, at the same time law cannot be ultimately beholden 
to a power apart from itself. Much of that is conveyed by law’s impartiality. The lack 
of containing ties to the existent that comes with law’s responsive dimension orients it 
towards an absence of attachment in its ‘application.’ Yet impartiality is not finally 
feasible since it becomes inevitably compromised in the influence-ridden scene of 
application, in the judicial decision for example. This inevitable diminishing, 
however, does not counter the integrity of the quality of impartiality. This much can 
be discerned negatively in that it would not be an answer to a failure of impartiality to 
say that one was impartial in part. Within the determinate, within the realized law 
there would still subsist the unrealized possibility of its opening to, or falling into, 
being otherwise – the possibility of its being without the partiality of its determinate 
existence. This possibility always remains anterior to the law iterably made 
determinate. The incipience of impartiality remains within that law. So positioned, 
impartiality is a “manner of being” in law (cf. Derrida, “Negotiations” 13).  
Likewise with law’s generality. Because of the requirement that laws be general, it 
used often to be said that a putative law effecting a specific determination does not 
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count as law (Locke 396; Rousseau 82). So, legislating for the specific liability of a 
specific wrongdoer would not count as law, as opposed to a law prescribing a general 
standard of liability for all wrongdoers generically categorized. Yet, if the general 
cannot find itself in that determinate existence of law which would result from a 
specific determination, it cannot be so general that it adheres to nothing specific and 
has no operative content. Hence the common and paradoxical requirement that law’s 
“generality must be specific” (Neumann 28). The generality of law will always be 
countered in its specific ‘application,’ but within that specificity there is always the 
incipience of law’s extending in its generality and being otherwise. In such ways, as 
with its impartiality and generality, law moves beyond the assertion of particular 
power and receptively responds to possibility. Its strength, like the poet’s, is the lack 
of strength, and the lack in strength: 
 
Spender told Auden he wondered whether he, Spender, ought to write prose. But Auden 
put his foot down. “You must write nothing but poetry, we do not want to lose you for 
poetry.” “But do you really think I’m any good?” gulped Spender. “Of course,” Auden 
frigidly replied. “But why?” “Because you are so infinitely capable of being humiliated. 
Art is born of humiliation.” (Fenton 248)6
 
NOTES 
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1 See, for example, Fitzpatrick (‘Transformations’ and ‘Crime as Resistance’). For an opening out by 
way of ‘law and literature’ to other perspectives beyond law, and colonial law, as usually conceived 
see Manji (“Mask Dancing,” “Someday” and “Law, Literature, Labour”). 
 
2 My translation. 
 
3 Significant orientations of works of literature, but not of the idea of literature itself, towards the law 
of the law are provided by Butler (33-55) and Ramshaw. 
4 A beautiful elaboration of this conception of literature and a relating of it to law can be found in 
Foucault (“Blanchot”). 
 
5 The situation is adroitly rendered in Blanchot’s picaresque, The Madness of the Day, in which the 
feminine law emanates from “me:” she is “born of the one for whom she becomes the law,” and she 
is abjectly dependent on this all-powerful, determinate one (14-15). Then that dependence is 
inverted by the law herself. Having become the law, she then comes from beyond me and denies me 
a place anywhere and the ability to do anything: “she exalted me, only to raise herself up in her 
turn” (16). 
 
6 The supportive strength that comes with Sara Ramshaw’s invaluable research assistance must also 
be recorded. And returning to the combination of kindness and editors, I am grateful for the 
thoughtfulness of Cheryl Suzack. 
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